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ABSTRACT 
The Road to Rights: Protecting On-Demand Workers in the United States Gig Economy 
Viktoria Pitlik 
 
Federalism in the United States impedes the realization of human rights. This thesis explains 
how non-traditional workers are impacted by the inadequacies of the country’s labor legislation, 
demonstrated through the situation of workers in the gig economy. The gig economy is thriving 
but the workers are not included in federal labor legislation, and therefore their rights are not 
protected. States have the power to issue their own rulings on matters concerning the gig 
economy, but these decisions can vary by state. Using the example of Uber drivers, this paper 
shows how this discrepancy can result in human rights violations. There needs to be uniformity 
in the United States legal system in order for gig workers to claim their rights.
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 The United States has a booming gig economy, a market system involving short-term and 
informal relationships between workers and employers. Workers in the gig economy, herein 
referred to as gig workers, experience unique conditions of work that differ from traditional 
forms of labor. As a result, the United States has struggled to identify them with the existing 
labor categories of employees and independent contractors.  
 Due to the gig economy’s relatively recent emergence and rapid expansion, federal law 
does not cover gig workers. Instead, individual states have ruled independently on the 
classification of gig workers, which has resulted in disparities between states that label them as 
employees, and those who deem them independent contractors. This is problematic because 
independent contractors are not included in federal labor law that guarantees employees certain 
rights at work. An even greater issue is that these rights overlap with fundamental human rights 
that everyone is entitled to. Without laws that protect gig workers’ labor rights, they are also 
unable to exercise their human rights. 
 This paper analyzes how federalism affects the human rights of gig workers, using the 
situation of Uber drivers as an example. My research explains the reasoning behind the 
differences in state rulings on employment classification, which ultimately determine which 
workers have rights. This paper will also uncover whether human rights were considered in these 
decisions at all, and the implications of this on the overall labor legislation in the United States. 
Adding the human rights framework to the issue shows how federalism can result in rights 
violations. 
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 Labor has evolved over time, but there have always been two constants: the inadequacy 
of existing legislation and the complications of federalism. Whether the gig economy will persist 
is not a subject in this essay because the importance of rights for gig workers lies in the plain fact 
that the gig economy exists right now. Gig workers may be unfamiliar to the traditional labor 
market, but they deserve protection nonetheless. 
II. Where Do Rights Come From? 
 
 The labor legislation in the United States is failing the workers in the gig economy. 
Henry M. Hart Jr. says the purpose of law is to settle the problems of the people living 
interdependently in a community.1 As such, the formation of law must begin at the grassroots 
level by taking the citizens’ circumstances and needs into account.2 Among the variety of laws, 
some serve to tell citizens their rights and freedoms. The federal government has shirked its duty 
to draft legislation relating to the gig economy, leaving gig workers without protection under 
federal law. While this is an obstacle for gig workers to exercise their rights, it is not an impasse. 
The responsibility of writing law is shared by both federal and state governments, a system 
called federalism. Hart Jr. describes federalism as a “fractionalization of authority” because 
power is divided between all levels of government.3 At the same time, federalism is also a 
fractionalization of responsibility. 
 Scholars discuss two theories on federalism and how they relate to human rights, 
specifically those guaranteed by international human rights law.4 Some citizens believe that the 
                                                
1 Henry M. Hart Jr., “The Relations between State and Federal Law,” Columbia Law Review 54, no. 4 
2 Hart, “The Relations,” 490. 
3 Ibid., 490. 
4 Catherine Powell, “Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights 
Law in the United States,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150, no. 1 (November 2001): 246; 
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Constitution is the supreme law of the United States and have formed an ideology called 
constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is defined by Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad as the idea that 
the Constitution protects individual rights and limits the power of the government.5 More 
generally, constitutionalism is a narrow construction of the text as evidence for rights. Catherine 
Powell describes the first theory on federalism, the constitutional theory, which asserts that the 
federal government has authority over foreign affairs.6 Proponents believe international human 
rights laws must be implemented through federal laws and courts.7 The contrasting view is the 
revisionist theory, which favors more fragmentation and power reserved for states.8 According to 
Johanna Kalb, international human rights treaties align with affairs typically regulated by states.9 
Revisionists argue that the adoption of international human rights law as a part of federal law 
would be an infringement on state sovereignty.10 These theories demonstrate a major problem of 
federalism—the tension between who has the authority, and responsibility, to protect human 
rights. 
 This conflict also plays out in matters concerning labor. Mark Barenberg discusses 
different models of labor federalism that exist simultaneously in the United States.11 Two of 
these models involve federal power: national uniformity and national minimum standards.12 
However, another form is state regulatory primacy, when states regulate labor without 
                                                                                                                                                       
Johanna Kalb, “Dynamic Federalism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation,” Tulane Law Review 84, 
no. 4 (March 2010): 1027. 
5 Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
132. 
6 Powell, “Dialogic Federalism, 255. 
7 Ibid., 246. 
8 Ibid., 247. 
9 Kalb, “Dynamic Federalism,” 1027. 
10 Ibid., 1027. 
11 Mark Barenberg, “Law and Labor in the New Global Economy: Through the Lens of United States 
Federalism,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 33, no. 3 (1995): 451. 
12 Barenberg, “Law and Labor,” 451. 
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interference from the federal government.13 Barenberg explains that labor federalism has led to 
vast disparities in labor standards among states.14 He lists examples to prove this, such as 
variances in the number of workers provided unemployment and welfare benefits in different 
states.15 In addition, Hart Jr. notes that state courts are often the first sites where matters of 
regulation are officially settled.16 State courts resolve issues within their domain, but each state 
can have different rulings, leading to inconsistency in laws and standards across the country.17 
As a result, workers in one state may be granted more rights than workers in another.  
 The dichotomy between federal and state authority exacerbates the challenge of 
protecting gig workers universally. In the absence of federal legislation, they are vulnerable to 
the decisions made at the state level, which can lead to rights violations in certain states. 
Furthermore, the differences between state rulings create uncertainty around work and businesses 
that cross state lines. When a group is as substantial as gig workers in that it spans across the 
country, there needs to be uniformity in legislation in order to resolve the issue of protecting gig 
workers universally. 
 
Labor Identity and Labor Struggles 
 
 A worker’s ability to claim rights under law depends on their labor identity. Labor 
identity can be understood as the identity formed around the distinctive qualities of a laborer and 
her work. This can include the tasks performed, level of skill or specialization, and the worker’s 
relative position in the hierarchy of authority. As labor evolves over time, the perception of what 
                                                
13 Ibid., 452. 
14 Ibid., 453. 
15 Ibid., 453. 
16 Hart, “The Relations," 492. 
17 Ibid., 491. 
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constitutes ‘normal’ or ‘acceptable’ work changes. Atypical workers are often not included in the 
labor identities that are covered by existing legislation, or it applies to them in ways that prevents 
them from exercising their rights. In the past, the labor identity of atypical workers even 
involved their race and gender. 
 The most significant transformation of labor in the United States concerned indentured 
servants and slaves. Mary Sarah Bilder and Don Edward Fehrenbacher recount the dispute 
between federal and state regulation of these workers, yet both forms of government had laws 
that designated the workers’ identity as property.18 Fehrenbacher writes that states regulated 
slavery inside their borders with laws called slave codes.19 Each state’s slave codes could be 
different, and at the same time some states prohibited slavery all together. The disagreement 
between states culminated in the Civil War, and the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
ultimately settled the matter.  
 James Gray Pope explains that the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and 
involuntary servitude while simultaneously granting labor rights.20 Debates over the 
interpretation of ‘involuntary servitude’ created conflict between the freedom of contract, which 
is a worker’s right to create and enter enforceable contracts, and freedom of labor, which is a 
worker’s right to terminate their contract at any moment.21 Pope claims that when the Supreme 
Court heard cases on this dispute, it tended to favor freedom of labor, which enforced workers’ 
                                                
18 Mary Sarah Bilder, “The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of 
Commerce,” Missouri Law Review 61, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 12, HeinOnline; Don Edward Fehrenbacher, 
Slavery, Law, and Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective (Oxford University Press, 
1981), 17. 
19 Fehrenbacher, Slavery, 17. 
20 James Gray Pope, “Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary 
Servitude,”” Yale Law Journal 119, no. 7 (2010): 1478. 
21 Pope, “Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor,” 1482. 
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right to quit.22 He also provides examples of other rights that workers successfully claimed under 
the Amendment, including the right to receive fair wages, the right to change employers, the 
right to organize, and the right to strike for improved wages and working conditions.23 Lea S. 
VanderVelde’s analysis aligns with Pope’s ideas as she writes that the unequivocal right to quit 
work is derived from the Thirteenth Amendment, and she further states it was a broader gain for 
worker independence.24 She concludes that the amendment was “a milestone in the elimination 
of racial oppression, but it was also a milestone in the elimination of labor subjugation.”25 The 
Thirteenth Amendment linked workers’ labor identity to their fundamental rights, completely 
reshaping labor in the United States. 
 This is just one example that illustrates the pattern of labor in the country. There have 
consistently been groups of workers who cannot realize their rights because their labor identity is 
excluded from or harmed by existing laws. Eventually, these labels and laws were challenged 
through political and social movements as well as judicial proceedings, leading to new laws and 
amendments that benefited all workers.  
 The United States has neglected workers by ignoring the most important aspect of their 
identity—their humanity. This, compounded with the incompetency of the legal system due to 
federalism, creates problems for workers to claim their rights. Federalism can lead to differing 
state legislation and non-uniform regulation. In the case of slavery, this conflict resulted in a 
violent war. While past labor struggles have been resolved for the most part, federalism still 
exists and so the problem has not dissipated. There continue to be workers whose labor identity 
                                                
22 Ibid., 1482. 
23 Ibid., 1540. 
24 Lea S. VanderVelde, “The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment,” University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 138, no. 437 (2009): 438. 
25 VanderVelde, “The Labor Vision," 495. 
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does not align with that of normal workers, therefore they are not protected by labor legislation 
and cannot exercise their labor rights nor human rights. 
III.  Out With the Old, In With the New: The Emergence of the Gig 
Economy 
 
 Today, it is the gig economy that is altering the labor landscape and the typical perception 
of work. Jobs in the gig economy veer from the norms of the long-established labor market. 
Gerald Friedman states that unlike traditional work involving long-term relationships between 
employers and workers, the gig economy is a market system involving brief job arrangements.26 
Emilia Istrate and Jonathan Harris add that gig workers are only paid for singular tasks, as 
opposed to the steady salary from traditional work.27 The term “gig” stems from these relatively 
short interactions where workers only complete one job for one customer and then must find 
another job. 
 Another factor that distinguishes the gig economy from other forms of labor is the 
unorthodox employer-worker relationship. Gig workers are hired by companies that act as 
“intermediaries” to connect workers to customers.28 The workers enter explicit contracts to 
provide services for the company, but are not hired long-term because job availability is based on 
demand. These qualities create a unique labor identity for gig workers, which makes it difficult 
                                                
26 Gerald Friedman, "Workers Without Employers: Shadow Corporations And The Rise Of The Gig 
Economy,” Review Of Keynesian Economics 2, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 172, 
https://doi.org/10.2337/roke.2014.02.03. 
27 Emilia Istrate and Jonathan Harris, “The Future of Work: The Rise of the Gig Economy,” National 
Association of Counties, November 2017, https://www.naco.org/featured-resources/future-work-rise-gig-
economy#after-related. 
28 Jeremias Prassl, “Work on Demand,” in Humans as a Service: The Promise and Perils of Work in the 
Gig Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), Chapter 2, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797012.001.0001. 
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to classify them within existing categories of workers in the labor market. 
 
A Close Look at On-Demand Workers 
 
In recent years, a specific area of the gig economy has grown in popularity—the use of 
Internet-based platforms and applications that instantly connect workers to customers. Within 
this realm of gig work, coined “on-demand work,” Jeremias Prassl describes two types of jobs: 
crowdwork and work-on-demand via app.29 The word crowdwork derives from the process of 
customers uploading job requests on an online platform to a ‘crowd’ of workers. Crowdwork is 
done entirely digitally, requiring no face-to-face interaction.30 This enables crowdworkers to 
accept jobs from around the world and complete them remotely.31 In contrast, work-on-demand 
via app is requested using smartphone applications to find workers who are available at that 
exact moment. Work-on-demand via app must be completed in person, which restricts these 
workers to local clients.32 These forms of on-demand work are distinct, but there are some 
similarities in the features of their work. 
 The digital nature of the on-demand gig economy creates unique working conditions for 
gig workers. Scholars who research crowdwork note some of its advantages.33 In a survey for the 
International Labor Organization, Janine Berg found that respondents were most drawn to 
                                                




33 Janine Berg, “Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Finding and Policy Lessons from a Survey 
of Crowdworkers,” Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 37, no. 3 (March 2016): 7, Social Science 
Research Network;  Mark Graham, Isis Hjorth, and Vili Lehdonvirta, “Digital labour and development: 
impacts of global digital labour platforms and the gig economy on worker livelihoods,” Transfer: 
European Review of Labour and Research 23, no. 2 (2017): 47, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1024258916687250. 
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crowdwork because of their ability to work from home.34 People who are unable to leave their 
houses, perhaps due to disability, illness, or responsibilities, benefit from being able to work 
online.35 Mark Graham et. al. declare another benefit of crowdwork is “economic inclusion,” 
described as the ability to be hired without discrimination due to workers’ anonymity on online 
platforms.36 Migrants are one example because they may not be able to work in traditional jobs 
because they don’t have the necessary visas or permits.37 The virtual features of crowdwork 
allow workers to avoid obstacles that prevent them from finding other work.  
 Johnathan Hall and Alan Kreuger note that crowdwork and work-on-demand via app 
share some benefits, such as flexible schedules and a supplemental source of income to 
complement pay from other jobs.38 Antonio Aloisi finds that those who work-on-demand via app 
also have lower entry barriers, such as fewer education or skill requirements.39 They can also use 
assets they already own, such as tools and cars, which makes entry into the gig economy more 
affordable.40 These benefits make the on-demand gig economy attractive for both types of on-
demand gig workers. 
 Despite the positive aspects, an abundance of literature focuses on the downsides of work 
in the gig economy.41 Valerio De Stefano argues that on-demand companies are commodifying 
                                                
34 Berg, “Income Security in the On-Demand Economy,” 7.  
35 Ibid., 8. 
36 Graham, et. al., “Digital labour and development,” 47. 
37 Ibid., 47. 
38 Jonathan Hall and Alan Kreuger, “An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the 
United States,” Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper 587 (January 2015): 11. 
39 Antonio Aloisi, “Commoditized Workers: Case study research on labour law issues arising from a set 
of “on-demand/gig economy” platforms,” Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 37, no. 3 (August 
2015): 670, Social Science Research Network. 
40 Aloisi, “Commoditized Workers,” 670. 
41 Valerio de Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce: On-demand work, Crowdwork and 
Labour Protection in the Gig Economy,” Conditions of Work and Employment Series no. 71 (2016): 4, 
International Labor Organization;  Joellen Riley, "Brand New ‘Sharing’ or Plain Old ‘Sweating’?: A 
Proposal for Regulating the New ‘Gig Economy,’” in New Directions for Law in Australia: Essays in 
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labor into what he calls “humans-as-a-service.”42 He explains that jobs in the gig economy are 
often coined “gigs,” “tasks,” or even “favors,” which undermine their value and perpetuate the 
idea that they are not ‘real’ work.43 In addition, the transactions from behind a screen hide the 
fact that customers are interacting with a human being.44 Crowdworkers specifically are 
perceived as “invisible workers” because of the lack of in-person contact, which can lead to 
insensitivity, mistreatment, and even dehumanization.45 Thus, while the virtual nature of gig 
work enables workers to work from home or set flexible schedules, it can also lead to 
misconceptions and disrespect. 
 Joellen Riley agrees with De Stefano that the companies take advantage of the informal 
contracts to avoid the title and duties of traditional employers, shifting the risks of the job to the 
workers.46 Gig workers face the possibility of low demand for work and resulting low income. 
High levels of competition also reduce the workers’ earnings and force them to take on more 
jobs, paradoxically reducing the flexibility of gig work that is typically seen as a major benefit.47 
Gig workers also take on more responsibilities as the companies do not provide tools used for the 
jobs and so gig workers shoulder the price of purchasing and maintaining them, in addition to 
insurance and taxes.48 These risks and extra costs can be a burden for gig workers. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Contemporary Law Reform (Australia: ANU Press, 2017), 62;  Alex Wood, Mark Graham, Vili 
Lehdonvirta, and Isis Hjorth, “Good Gig, Bad Gig: Autonomy and Algorithmic Control in the Global Gig 
Economy,” Work, Employment, and Society 33, no. 1 (August 2018): 64, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017018785616. 
42 De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce," 4. 
43 Valerio de Stefano, “Introduction: Crowdsourcing, the Gig Economy and the Law,” Comparative 
Labor Law & Policy Journal 37, no. 3 (April 2016): 2. As described by De Stefano in this article, ‘real’ 
work relates to the traditional perception of work, i.e. long-term arrangements. 
44 De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce,” 4. 
45 Ibid., 4. 
46 Riley, "Brand New ‘Sharing,’” 62; De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce," 5. 
47 De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce," 5. 
48 Riley, "Brand New ‘Sharing,’” 62. 
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 Riley and De Stefano further concur that on-demand workers also have the responsibility 
of proving their worth.49 The companies monitor gig workers by looking at reviews from 
customers, so the workers have to make sure they get good ratings in order to be allowed to 
work.50 This puts added pressure on gig workers and forces them to put in extra effort to increase 
the likelihood of a good rating. Due to their digital tasks, crowdworkers might face expectations 
to have the same skill and precision as a computer software.51 This creates potential for even a 
slight error or delay to impact the worker’s rating, so they have to work hard to meet customers’ 
demands.52 For those who work-on-demand via app, their ratings are largely influenced by their 
interactions with customers. They have to perform “emotional labor” like showing kindness or 
holding conversation in order to get good reviews.53 Sarah Donovan says that the companies 
depend on the excellence of the gig workers for profit and success, so they terminate contracts 
with those who do not meet their standard of quality or professionalism.54 Riley and Alex Wood, 
et. al. describe that crowdwork platforms use algorithms to filter jobs away from workers with 
lower ratings, making it hard for them to find work, and companies who manage work-on-
demand via app platforms can block workers from accessing the platform if they have low 
ratings, effectively firing the worker.55 As a result, customer ratings further decrease job security 
in the on-demand gig economy. 
                                                
49 Ibid., 63; De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce," 5. 
50 Riley, "Brand New ‘Sharing,’” 63. 
51 De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce,” 5. 
52 Ibid., 5. 
53 Ibid., 5. 
54 Sarah Donovan, “What Does the Gig Economy Mean for Workers?” Congressional Research Service 
Report (February 2016): 7, HeinOnline. 
55 Wood, et. al., “Good Gig, Bad Gig,” 64; Riley, “Brand New ‘Sharing,’” 63. 
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 Some scholars are especially critical of the role of the companies in the gig economy.56 
Riley contends that the gig economy has been designed to benefit the company only, not the 
workers.57 The workers are reliant on the company for jobs but also vulnerable to its power over 
them. Prassl mentions this is because the companies set prices, establish quotas for the number of 
jobs that must be accepted, and determine what information the worker and customer receive.58 
Moreover, Friedman calls the gig economy a system of “shadow businesses relying on a 
transient workforce," with no job ladder or “mutual interest in the well-being of both the 
company and the workforce.”59 He claims that because of the informal work arrangement, there 
is no connection between the worker and employer.60 These details demonstrate how the on-
demand companies take advantage of gig workers.  
 All labor relations have negative aspects, but the positives are just as important. This is 
the reason why, despite the vast evidence of the disadvantages, the gig economy continues to 
thrive in the United States. Thus, rather than trying to eliminate the disadvantages, the most 
crucial thing for gig workers is to be able to exercise their rights. This, of course, ties into labor 
identity and legislation.  
 
Problems with Classification 
 
 The novel labor identity of gig workers is currently dissociated from human rights. 
Friedman explains that the flexible contracts and short-term job arrangements makes gig work 
temporary and informal, so gig workers are typically not considered official employees of the 
                                                
56 Riley, “Brand New ‘Sharing,’” 62; Prassl, “Work on Demand,” Chapter 2; Friedman, “Workers 
Without Employers,” 172. 
57 Riley, “Brand New ‘Sharing,’” 62. 
58 Prassl, “Work on Demand,” Chapter 2. 
59 Friedman, “Workers Without Employers,” 172. 
60 Ibid., 172. 
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company they work for.61 The gig economy also includes a variety of work, ranging from legal 
research and data verification to cleaning services and food delivery, which leads to a 
generalization of gig work. For these reasons, gig workers are often broadly classified as 
independent contractors. 
 The independent contractor label is problematic because federal labor laws do not cover 
independent contractors. This includes the Fair Labor Standards Act that entitles employees to 
minimum wage and overtime pay, and the National Labor Relations Act that protects various 
employee rights, such as organizing and collective bargaining.62 By excluded gig workers from 
these laws, not only are they vulnerable to the companies’ control, it is also more difficult for 
them to fight for improvements. This deteriorates the quality of the working conditions in the gig 
economy. Overall, the advantages of the gig economy are outweighed by the workers’ 
independent contractor status. 
 In addition to being treated as independent contractors, De Stefano writes that the unique 
features of on-demand work also make it challenging for gig workers to exercise their labor 
rights.63 In the International Labor Organization’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
the three rights most relevant to gig workers are freedom of association, the right to collective 
bargaining, and freedom from discrimination.64 As gig workers find jobs online, there is no 
physical workplace where they could meet to exercise the freedom of association.65 Sian Lazar 
and Andrew Sanchez note the digital platforms also impede the workers’ ability to identify each 
                                                
61 Ibid., 172. 
62 “Handy Reference Guide to the Fair Labor Standards Act,” Wage and Hour Division, United States 
Department of Labor, last updated September 2016, https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/hrg.htm;  
“National Labor Relations Act,” National Labor Relations Board, accessed June 2, 2019, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/how-we-work/national-labor-relations-act. 
63 De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce,” 9. 
64 Ibid., 9. 
65 Ibid., 9. 
   
 14 
other and form a common identity, which makes organizing a challenge.66 The inability to 
practice freedom of association almost completely negates the right to collective bargaining as 
workers are unable to come together to discuss concerns or strategies.67 Furthermore, the 
complexity of the platforms can make it hard to identify their employer for negotiations.68 
Finally, on-demand platforms can keep workers anonymous, which may prevent discrimination 
from clients when requesting jobs. At the same time, however, jobs can be restricted by 
geographical area, language, or skill sets, and discrimination can still be expressed through 
customer ratings.69 The digital nature of on-demand gig work is an obstacle for workers to 
exercise their rights.  
 On-demand companies assert that gig workers are independent contractors because they 
benefit the most from this classification. As Friedman points out, companies are able to hire 
workers and adjust wages based on demand, with no promise of future employment.70 Workers 
are employed only to perform a specific task, so the company benefits from their skill and labor 
without having to train them, provide tools, or pay continuous salaries.71 De Stefano notes that 
by treating gig workers as independent contractors, the companies also shed potential liabilities 
and obligations such as minimum wage, social security, sick days, holidays, and unemployment 
benefits.72 This employer-worker relationship, or lack thereof, is advantageous for the company 
but detrimental to gig workers. 
                                                
66 Sian Lazar and Andrew Sanchez, “Understanding labour politics in an age of precarity,” Dialectical 
Antropology 43, no. 1 (February 2019): 9, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-019-09544-7. 
67 De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce,” 9. 
68 Ibid., 8. 
69 Ibid., 11. 
70 Friedman, “Workers Without Employers,” 180. 
71 Ibid., 180. 
72 De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time’ Workforce,” 13. 
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 Sarah Donovan argues the gig economy is different from the independent contractor 
system.73 Gig workers have more flexibility because they choose when to enter and leave the gig 
economy altogether, whereas independent contractors create a business around their work and 
would have greater difficulty switching occupations.74 However, on-demand companies are 
already established so gig workers do not have to invest in building and marketing a business, 
which lowers operating costs.75 In addition, independent contractors are able to build lasting 
relationships with customers, which can lead to repeat business. In contrast, gig workers are 
randomly matched to customers, so customers are unable to request services from specific 
workers. Lastly, independent contractors have no direct employer that mandates a quota or 
standard of quality, but workers in the gig economy must follow the rules that the companies 
dictate. Despite the claims that on-demand companies are solely intermediaries connecting 
workers to customers, they actually exert control over the workers. The companies take a portion 
of the workers’ earnings for service fees, up to 30% on some platforms.76 Some companies also 
prohibit gig workers from finding customers outside the platform, which prevents them from 
expanding their client base.77 The companies thus restrict the workers and deny them the 
freedoms that are beneficial for independent contractors. 
 The non-traditional labor identity of gig workers has led to the classification as 
independent contractors. This impacts the rights they are legally entitled to, intensifying their 
inability to exercise their labor rights caused by the digital nature of the gig economy. As 
                                                
73 Donovan, “What Does the Gig Economy Mean,” 3. 
74 Ibid., 2. 
75 Ibid., 6. 
76 Prassl, “Work on Demand,” Chapter 2. 
77 Donovan, “What Does the Gig Economy Mean,” 7. 
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Donovon explains, the title of independent contractor is an imperfect fit for gig workers. 
Therefore, labor identity should not be the determinant of their rights. 
IV.  Fighting for Change: Uber Drivers 
 
 The recent and rapid growth of the gig economy has left gig workers without a place in 
the traditional labor market, without legislation that covers them, and without rights. They are 
not, however, without agency. The country’s history shows that rights are not always granted 
automatically; they must be fought for. Just like the struggles of laborers in the past, now gig 
workers are fighting the injustice of the legal system by challenging existing laws. Specifically, 
gig workers need to be considered official employees of the companies they work for in order to 
be guaranteed the rights included in federal labor laws. 
 A multitude of on-demand gig workers have disputed their employment classification and 
drawn national attention to the issue. One prominent group engaged in this debate is Uber drivers 
who work-on-demand via app. Uber is a transportation network company that connects drivers 
and customers through the Uber phone application to facilitate transportation services. It is a 
popular on-demand platform that operates in almost every American state and numerous 
countries around the world. Uber drivers constitute one of the largest gig workforces in the 
United States, so it is crucial to protect their rights. 
 Uber drivers’ contracts say the agreement creates an independent contractor relationship 
with the company.78 Uber encourages this classification so that the company can avoid the legal 
                                                
78 Darrin E. McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity and Uber Technologies, Inc. District Court 
of Florida, Third District (2017), No. 3D15-2758; Claimants v. Uber Technologies, Inc. New York 
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (2017), No. 016-23858. 
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obligations that employers have.79 Despite this, Uber drivers in Massachusetts and California 
filed class action lawsuits claiming they are misclassified as independent contractors and entitled 
to employee benefits.80 In 2018, the United States Supreme Court ruled that employers can 
leverage the arbitration clauses in their contracts to prevent class action lawsuits such as these.81 
This reduced the size of the worker pool that was eligible to file the suit against Uber, and a $20 
million settlement was reached in 2019.82 The Supreme Court’s ruling affects all workers with 
arbitration clauses in their contracts and influenced many to turn to individual arbitration instead. 
 The complications that arise from federalism are illustrated through the situation of Uber 
drivers. Table 1 lists the states that have passed laws on the classification of transportation 
network company (TNC) drivers, like Uber drivers.83  Among these laws, all but one specify a 
                                                
79 Ibid. 
80 “Uber Drivers,” Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., last modified March 2019, https://uberlawsuit.com. 
81 Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Uphold Workplace Arbitration Contracts Barring Class Actions,” New 
York Times, May 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/business/supreme-court-upholds-
workplace-arbitration-contracts.html. 
82 Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., “Uber Drivers.” 
83 Sources for the information in Table 1, in order of appearance. It might be interesting to note that these 
are only some examples of state laws that create a presumption that TNC drivers are independent 
contractors. “Senate Bill 800, An Act to Ensure the Safety, Reliability, and Cost-effectiveness of 
Transportation Network Company,” 2015 Regular Session, State of Arkansas, March 4, 2015, 
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2015/2015R/Acts/Act1050.pdf;  “AB-5 Worker status: employees 
and independent contractors,” Bill Information, California Legislature, September 11, 2019, 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5;  “Chapter 19. 
Transportation Networks,” Delaware Code Online, State of Delaware, accessed August 10, 2019, 
https://delcode.delaware.gov/title2/c019/index.shtml;  “627.748 Transportation network companies,” 
2018 Florida Statutes, Chapter 627 Insurance Rates and Contracts, Florida Senate, accessed August 10, 
2019, https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2018/627.748;  “HB 789, Labor and industrial relations; 
marketplace contractors to be treated as independent contractors under state and local laws,” 2017-2018 
Regular Session, Georgia General Assembly, last modified March 27, 2018, 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20172018/HB/789;  “Chapter 19.1 Transportation 
Network Companies,” 2019 Session, Indiana General Assembly, accessed August 11, 2019, 
http://iga.in.gov/legislative/laws/2019/ic/titles/008#8-2.1-19.1-4;  “Limousine, Taxicab, and 
Transportation Network Company Act,” Michigan Legislature, accessed August 10, 2019, 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(kkons4zjupjttd2ls22tif1q))/mileg.aspx?page=GetObject&objectname=
mcl-act-345-of-2016;  “Chapter 387,” Revisor of Statutes, State of Missouri, accessed August 10, 2019, 
http://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=387.414&bid=34470&hl=;  “Chapter 20 - Motor 
Vehicles,” North Carolina General Statutes, accessed August 10, 2019, 
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presumption that TNC drivers are independent contractors.84 In comparison, Table 2 shows the 
states that have issued authoritative decisions on Uber drivers specifically.85  These decisions are 
not written law, but court rulings and labor department opinions. Table 2 illustrates the 
inconsistency that results from federalism, as some states declare Uber drivers are employees 
while others say they are independent contractors. Furthermore, the decisions in Table 2 not only 
contradict each other, but those in favor of employee classification also conflict with the explicit 
TNC laws in Table 1. 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
https://www.ncleg.gov/Laws/GeneralStatuteSections/Chapter20;  “Chapter 32-40, Transportation 
Network Companies,” Codified Laws, South Dakota Legislature, accessed August 10, 2019, 
https://sdlegislature.gov/Statutes/Codified_Laws/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=32-40;  
“Transportation Network Companies Law,” Texas Department of Licensing and Registration, accessed 
August 10, 2019, https://www.tdlr.texas.gov/tnc/tnclaw.htm#2402114;  “Article 29. Transportation 
Network Companies,” West Virginia Code, West Virginia Legislature, last modified June 13, 2019, 
http://www.wvlegislature.gov/wvcode/Code.cfm?chap=17&art=29. 
84 Ibid. See Table 1.  
85 Sources for the information in Table 2, in order of appearance. Darrin E. McGillis v. Department of 
Economic Opportunity and Uber Technologies, Inc. District Court of Florida, Third District (2017), No. 
3D15-2758;  Claimants v. Uber Technologies, Inc. New York Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 
(2017), No. 016-23858;  Claimant v. Uber Technologies, Inc. California Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board (2015), No. 5371509;  Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc. United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (2018), No.16-573;  Brad Avakian, “Advisory Opinion of the 
Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries of the State of Oregon Regarding: The Employment 
Status of Uber Drivers,” Bureau of Labor and Industries, 2015;  “Uber Agrees to Stop Worker 
Misclassification in Alaska,” State of Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Press 
Release, No. 15-38, September 3, 2015, https://labor.alaska.gov/news/2015/news15-38.pdf. 
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Table 1. Classification of TNC Drivers under US State Laws 
State Classification Year 
Arkansas Independent Contractor Effective 2015 
California Employee Passed in State Senate 
September 2019 
Delaware Independent Contractor Effective 2016 
Florida Independent Contractor Effective 2018 
Georgia Independent Contractor Tabeled by State Senate in 
2018 
Indiana Independent Contractor Effective 2015 
Michigan Independent Contractor Effective 2017 
Missouri Independent Contractor Effective 2017 
North Carolina Independent Contractor Effective 2015 
South Dakota Independent Contractor Effective 2017 
Texas Independent Contractor Effective 2017 
West Virginia Independent Contractor Effective 2016 
 
Table 2. Classification of Uber Drivers in the United States 
State Classification Decision Type Year 
Alaska Employee Workers’ Compensation 
Board Decision 
2015 
California Employee Court Decision 2015 
Florida Independent Contractor Court Decision 2017 
New York Employee Court Decision 2017 
Oregon Employee Advisory Opinion 2015 
Pennsylvania Independent Contractor Court Decision 2018 
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 There is an evident disparity between state’s positions on the employment status of Uber 
drivers. However, the reason for this is not obvious. There is no notable variance in Uber drivers’ 
work in different states, nor an apparent correlation with independent contractor status and the 
prevalence of TNCs, union membership, or the influence of Uber or big business. In fact, the 
state where Uber is headquartered—California—is currently the only state drafting legislation 
that presumes TNC drivers are employees.86 It is essential to analyze the reasons behind these 
contradictions because they determine the states where Uber drivers can exercise their rights, and 
those where their rights are violated. 
 The following analysis draws from the evidence in the Florida and New York court 
cases.87 These states are particularly interesting to compare because the states’ actions after the 
cases reinforce their court’s position: Florida enacted law 627.748 that established the 
presumption that TNC drivers are independent contractors, and New York’s largest city, New 
York City, adopted the first ever minimum wage law for drivers of ride-hail applications like 
Uber.88 Before assessing the greater significance of these contrasting rulings, the arguments in 
each case must first be understood. 
  
                                                
86 “AB-5 Worker status: employees and independent contractors,” Bill Information, California 
Legislature, September 11, 2019, 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5. 
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of Florida, Third District (2017), No. 3D15-2758;  Claimants v. Uber Technologies, Inc. New York 
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88 “627.748 Transportation network companies,” 2018 Florida Statutes, Chapter 627 Insurance Rates and 
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Florida: Uber Drivers are Not Employees 
 
 In the opinion filed on February 1, 2017, the State of Florida’s Third District Court of 
Appeals ruled that Uber drivers are independent contractors in the case Darrin E. McGillis vs. 
Department of Economic Opportunity; and Raiser LLC, d/b/a Uber Technologies, Inc. District 
Court of Florida, Third District (2017) (hereafter referred to as McGillis v. Uber or the Florida 
case). Darrin E. McGillis is a former Uber driver who filed a claim against Uber for 
reemployment assistance after his access to the platform was revoked. The Florida Department 
of Revenue originally found McGillis was an employee, but Uber challenged this in a hearing in 
front of the Department of Economic Opportunity who then ruled that McGillis served as an 
independent contractor. In the present case, McGillis appealed the Department of Economic 
Opportunity’s order.89  
 The Third District Court of Appeals (Court) followed Florida common-law rules to 
inform their decision. First, the Court looked at Uber’s Software Sublicense and Online 
Agreement that drivers must accept before beginning work. The Agreement explicitly states it 
“create[s] the relationship of principal and independent contractor and not that of employer and 
employee.” It also declares that each transaction is considered a "separate contractual 
engagement.” However, the contract itself is not the sole determinant of employment status 
because the parties’ actual practice may contradict the agreement. According to Florida 
common-law, the parties’ practice trumps the contract in proving the employment relationship.90 
                                                
89 The following section draws heavily from Darrin E. McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity 
and Uber Technologies, Inc. District Court of Florida, Third District (2017), No. 3D15-2758. In Chicago 
style citations, one footnote at the end of the paragraph indicates that the entire paragraph is from that 
source. I have rearranged the order of the details in a different way than presented in the original 
document, but all of the information is derived from the text. 
90 Ibid. 
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 The Court analyzed the nature of the dealings between Uber and the drivers by referring 
to the Restatement of the Law (Second) of Agency § 220, which outlines multiple factors that 
indicate whether the employment relationship is indicative of independent contractors or 
employees. The first factor listed in the Restatement is “the extent of control which, by the 
agreement, the master may exercise over details of the work.” McGillis and all Uber drivers 
decide when they want to work, in what location, and which rides to accept or reject. Uber 
requires information about their driver’s license, vehicle, registration, insurance, and drivers may 
be subject to a background check, but they do not have to display Uber signage in their vehicle, 
adhere to a dress code, or refrain from working on competitors’ platforms. McGillis had 
dedicated his own time and money to investigate the times and locations that are most profitable 
for work, but Uber did not require him to do this research and did not reimburse him for it. Uber 
also did not prohibit McGillis from his simultaneous work with the competitor Lyft. The Court 
thus decided McGillis exercised control over the details of his work.91 
 Another factor in the Restatement is whether the work is “done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision.” The Court found that Uber does not directly 
supervise the drivers but instead looks at customer feedback. After a ride, passengers are 
prompted to rate their driver on a scale of one to five stars. If a driver’s score falls below a 
predetermined level and there is no improvement over a period of time, Uber may deactivate 
their account. Uber itself does not evaluate the drivers but relies on customers to assess the 
drivers’ quality.92 
 The Court also considered details related to “whether the employer or the workman 
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work” and “the method of payment, 
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whether by the time or by the job.” Uber drivers must secure their own vehicles, pay for its 
maintenance and gas, and independently choose the location of their work. Drivers only get paid 
for the jobs they complete. Uber charges the passenger after a ride and drivers receive a portion 
of the fares in a weekly direct deposit. At the end of the year, Uber sends the drivers a Form 
1099, which is an Internal Revenue Service form used for independent contractors. The Court 
also noted Uber provides the drivers with additional insurance coverage for their vehicle but no 
benefits such as medical insurance or vacation pay.93 
 Through the analysis of the parties’ contract and working relationship, the Court found 
that McGillis and all Uber drivers are not employees of the company. In particular, the Court 
concluded that the drivers’ autonomy is the most significant part of their work, stating “[this] 
free agency is incompatible with the control to which a traditional employee is subject.” The 
Court affirmed the Department’s order that Uber drivers are not entitled to reemployment 
assistance and denied McGillis’ claim.94 
 
New York: Uber Drivers are Entitled to Benefits 
 
 There is a stark contrast between McGillis v. Uber and Claimants v. Uber Technologies, 
Inc. New York Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (2017) (hereafter referred to as the New 
York case). In the New York case, filed on June 9, 2017, the claimants were referred to by their 
initials—AK, JH, and JS. The New York Department of Labor determined in 2014 that the 
claimants and all others in similar situations are employees of Uber and eligible to receive 
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benefits. Uber challenged the finding in this hearing by arguing the drivers are independent 
contractors.95 
 Judge Michelle Burrowes first explains the on-boarding process for Uber drivers, who are 
labeled by the company as “partner-drivers.” To establish a drivers’ eligibility to work, Uber 
requires information about their driver’s license, vehicle registration and insurance, and New 
York City Taxi & Limousine Commission (TLC) for-hire driver’s license. Uber did not perform 
a background check on the claimants because a valid TLC license requires them to have passed a 
background check. At an Uber office, the claimants were shown a video about how the 
application works and ‘best practice guidelines’ that would be beneficial for them to follow but 
not required. This included keeping a clean car and wearing professional attire, even though 
there is no mandated dress code. As the final step of the on-boarding process the claimants 
agreed to contracts that designated them as independent contractors, but they were adhesion 
contracts that could not be negotiated.96 
 Judge Burrowes then analyzed the actual relationship between Uber and the drivers by 
focusing on “the extent of control.” Uber drivers decide on their work schedule and location and 
are responsible for paying for their vehicle’s gas and maintenance. They are also not provided 
with benefits such as sick leave or health insurance. These qualities of work are equivalent to the 
independent contractor relationship described in the contract.97 
                                                
95 The following section draws heavily from Claimants v. Uber Technologies, Inc. New York 
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (2017), No. 016-23858. In Chicago style citations, one footnote 
at the end of the paragraph indicates that the entire paragraph is from that source. I have rearranged the 
order of the details in a different way than presented in the original document, but all of the information is 
derived from the text. 
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 Judge Burrowes described other aspects of control that are more indicative of an 
employer-employee relationship. Uber has certain requirements all drivers must follow, such as 
securing their own vehicle and smartphone to access the application. Uber dictates the vehicles 
the drivers must use, providing a list of acceptable vehicles that is more restrictive than that 
outlined by the Taxi and Limousine Commission. The vehicles are separated into three 
categories based on their quality—Uber X, Uber XL, and Uber Black—each with its own 
starting fare rate.98 
 Uber also controls aspects of work that have a more significant impact on the drivers. 
When drivers accept a ride request, they are informed only of the passenger’s name and pick-up 
location. It is not until the passenger is in the car that Uber gives the driver the drop-off location. 
The Judge stated that independent contractors would be given this information in advance before 
deciding whether to accept the request. In addition, drivers are required to use the application at 
least once a month to accept ride requests. This quota is not something an independent contractor 
would have to meet. Moreover, Uber controls all aspects of the payment transactions. After a 
ride is completed, Uber calculates the fare using an algorithm that considers market factors, like 
demand, and charges the customer through the application. Drivers have no input on the price 
and can only challenge it after the payment is completed, upon which Uber decides whether or 
not to adjust it.99 
 Judge Burrowes also found that Uber actively monitors drivers and tries to modify their 
behavior. Uber’s Code of Conduct states that drivers’ access to the platform can be deactivated if 
they do not meet Uber’s standards. Drivers are rated by passengers on a scale of one to five stars 
and if they have a persistently low score, Uber deactivates the driver’s account. Uber also 
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collects the drivers’ data while they work on the application and uses this information to make 
decisions about their access to the platform. Drivers are expected to accept 90% of ride requests, 
otherwise Uber temporarily deactivates their account. Drivers’ accounts can also be deactivated 
if they reject or cancel what Uber deems too many rides. Uber will reactivate drivers’ accounts if 
they demonstrate their conduct has improved, explain why they failed to meet Uber’s standards, 
or attend quality improvement courses. These facts led to Judge Burrowes’s assessment that 
Uber acts like an employer by being involved in not only what drivers do, i.e. provide 
transportation services, but also how they do it by requiring them to meet certain standards.100  
 Two New York labor laws were also referenced in the case. Labor Law § 511 (1) says 
“employment means any service under any contract of employment for hire … and any service 
by a person for an employer as a professional musician of a person otherwise engaged in the 
performing arts, and performing services.” The second law, Labor Law § 560 (1), states an 
employer is liable for contributions if they have paid workers "$300 or more in any calendar 
quarter… including salaries, commissions, and bonuses.”101 
 The Judge concluded that while the claimants have some independence, “the overriding 
evidence establishes that Uber exercised sufficient supervision, direction, and control over key 
aspects of the services rendered by claimants such that an employer-employee relationship was 
created.” Judge Burrowes sustained the Department of Labor’s 2014 decision that the claimants 
and all others similarly situated are employees of Uber and eligible to receive benefits.102 
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The Cases Juxtaposed 
 
 The Florida and New York cases have contradictory decisions, yet they share some 
commonalities. At the most basic level, the judicial bodies looked at both the contracts and the 
parties’ practice to inform their decision. Neither case provided a lengthy explanation of the 
parties’ written agreement, as both found that Uber’s contract inarguably designates the drivers 
as independent contractors.103 Both judiciaries then examined the relationship between Uber and 
the drivers.104 This established several facts, including that Uber drivers have the freedom to 
decide when and where to work, are permitted to work on competitors’ applications, and are not 
provided with any benefits such as paid vacation or health insurance.105 These findings were not 
contested in either case. 
 Other elements were also addressed in both cases but argued differently. In regards to 
supervision, both judiciaries noted that passengers rate their drivers after their trip and Uber will 
deactivate a driver’s account if their ratings fall below a certain level.106 The Court in McGillis v. 
Uber found the passenger ratings to prove that Uber does not directly supervise the drivers.107 
The Court also stated that due to this, drivers are permitted “just about any manner of customer 
interaction.”108 Judge Burrowes of New York would have found false, however, because drivers 
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are deactivated for low ratings based on poor interactions with customers.109 Judge Burrowes 
explained how deactivation means Uber tracks drivers’ data, and the reactivation process shows 
the company takes steps to modify their behavior.110 She further described that Uber responds to 
customer’s comments, which proves the company monitors drivers’ conduct.111 The New York 
case included an example of a passenger complained who that claimant AK had used an 
inefficient route during their trip so Uber reduced the passenger’s fare without notifying or 
consulting with AK, even though this reduced AK’s earnings.112 Uber might not physically 
supervise the drivers, but the company demonstrably observes their work and requires them to 
meet a high standard of quality. 
 Most importantly, the Florida and New York diverge in their analyses of control.113 If a 
hiring entity, such as Uber, has control over the result, it is considered an independent contractor 
relationship; if they control the means to achieve the results, it is an employer-employee 
relationship. In these cases, the Florida Court stressed that the drivers’ control indicates they are 
independent contractors, while the New York case emphasized that Uber’s control makes the 
drivers employees.114 
The difference is relevant to the rights of workers. With companies that only control 
result, workers have more freedom and rely less on safeguards to protect their rights. When 
companies control the means of work, however, the workers are vulnerable to the company’s 
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actions and decisions. Workers in the latter situation need to be able to exercise their rights so 
that the companies cannot exploit them. 
 The Florida Court never explicitly states that Uber’s control is focused only on result, but 
noted the Department of Economic Opportunity’s assessment that “Uber acts not as an employer, 
but as a middleman or broker for transportation services.”115 The Court also cited other court 
decisions where owner-operator truck drivers, salespersons, and other workers were deemed 
independent contractors due to aspects of their work that are similar to Uber drivers, such as the 
ability to set their own work schedule and refuse jobs.116 Judge Burrowes of New York agreed 
that these qualities of work are indicative of independent contractor status, but she did a more 
effective job of proving Uber’s control over the means of work.117 Uber became closely involved 
in claimants JS and JH’s work when they could not secure their own vehicles because of their 
low credit scores.118 Uber referred these claimants to a third-party affiliate who allowed them to 
lease cars, and the drivers signed waivers that authorized Uber to deduct a portion of their fares 
for the cost of leasing the vehicle and forward it to the lessor on their behalf.119 When JS 
neglected his payments, Uber also negotiated an alternative payment schedule with the lessor so 
that JS could continue to work.120 The Judge thus found that “Uber did not employ an arms’ 
length approach to the claimants as would typify an independent contractor arrangement.”121 The 
examples in the New York case are much stronger evidence that Uber acts like an employer by 
engaging in the details of the drivers’ work. 
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 The Florida and New York cases seem profoundly contradictory at first, but further 
analysis shows the similarities in the factors that were considered. Both judiciaries assessed 
driver independence, supervision, payments, and control to inform their decisions. Ultimately, 
however, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals devalued the parts of the work relationship 
that affect the drivers most. 
 
The Ignored Factor: Human Rights 
 
 The immediate results of the court rulings are clear. Uber drivers in New York are 
employees and guaranteed the rights and benefits that come with the status. In Florida, Uber 
drivers are treated as independent contractors and not provided any benefits by the company. The 
less obvious, yet more significant outcome is that the Florida ruling did more than name the 
employment classification of Uber drivers—it simultaneously stripped them of their rights. 
 Foremost, independent contractors are not included in labor laws and therefore Uber 
drivers are not guaranteed minimum wage, overtime pay, or benefits such as retirement funds 
and health insurance. The rights to organize, strike, and collective bargaining are also not 
protected. On April 16, 2019, the National Labor Relations Board published an Advice 
Memorandum that concluded Uber drivers are independent contractors.122 This statement is 
another barrier preventing Uber drivers from claiming federal protection of these rights. 
The fact that these rights are not protected does not mean gig workers cannot exercise 
them. Throughout the past year, Uber drivers across the United States have gone on strike to 
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fight for improved pay and working conditions.123 The issue with not being included in federal 
law, however, is that workers are not protected from employer backlash. Therefore, on-demand 
companies could potentially terminate contracts with workers who strike, filter jobs away from 
them on the platform, or find other ways to punish them for challenging the company. 
 Beyond the rights established by law, there is also an impact on the drivers’ human rights 
as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.124 This includes the right to fair 
remuneration, which simply means payment proportional to the work. Uber drivers are the sole 
staff that carries out Uber’s service, putting in time, effort, and their own money to work on the 
platform. Uber’s control over fares, however, affects their earnings. They do not receive 
adequate pay for their work, especially in comparison to independent contractors who have no 
employer that deducts from their fares. In addition, the inability to organize makes it impossible 
for Uber drivers to exercise their right to form and participate in unions. This further impedes 
their ability to negotiate with Uber or participate in collective bargaining. By manipulating the 
conditions of the work arrangement, Uber is not just impeding the drivers’ ability to exercise 
their rights to collective bargaining, unionization, and fair remuneration; it is actually violating 
these rights. This is subsequently also a violation of the right to favorable conditions of work. 
 More broadly, the conditions of work also impact the fundamental human right to life and 
dignity. Work is undoubtedly an important factor in the standard of life, so the unjust situation 
for Uber drivers harms the quality of their lives. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that all humans are born equal in dignity and rights. Classifying Uber drivers and 
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independent contractors undoubtedly creates a disparity between them and other workers whose 
rights are protected. Finally, it could even be argued that the classification violates the right to be 
free from discrimination because Uber drivers’ labor identity is treated differently that other 
workers. Ultimately, even though the other rights impacted by Uber’s conduct are specific to 
labor, it is impossible to ignore the universal importance of these human rights. 
 It should be noted that neither the New York nor Florida case mentioned human rights or 
even the drivers’ rights at work.125 The judiciaries followed the legal tendency to focus on 
technicalities instead. In doing so, they overlooked the greater issue concerning the power 
dynamic between Uber and the drivers. 
 
a. Unequal Control 
 
 
 Both cases investigated the extent of control exercised by Uber and the drivers.126 
Although the analyses were overly technical and did not include human rights, the language used 
in the New York case suggests Judge Burrowes was concerned with Uber’s dominance over the 
drivers.127 First, Judge Burrowes notes that the drivers’ contracts were “drafted solely by Uber” 
and “did not allow claimants to negotiate the terms.”128 Uber is able to mandate the conditions of 
work it deems most favorable for the company and use adhesion contracts that prevent debate 
and compromise. The Judge also frequently described Uber as acting “unilaterally:” Uber 
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“unilaterally” sets the base price charged to customers, “unilaterally” determines the amount of 
fees deducted from drivers’ fares, and “unilaterally” chooses the acceptable minimum star rating 
for drivers.129 These phrases demonstrate how key parts of work are dictated by Uber’s sole 
discretion. 
 Uber’s management of fares is another element of the employment relationship that 
establishes the company’s authority over the workers. The claimants in the New York case 
testified that they had “no input in determining the fare charged” because it is “determined 
solely” by Uber’s algorithm.130 Uber deducts 20-30% of the fare for fees, calculating the amount 
in part based on the type of vehicle used.131 Uber also decides if customers should be charged 
with wait fees or for cancelling rides.132 In addition, when a customer complained about the route 
claimant AK took, Uber admitted that it deducted the fare from AK’s earnings “without notice to 
AK.”133 After assessing this evidence, Judge Burrowes concluded that Uber’s control over fares 
affects the drivers’ earning potential.134 It is evident the drivers are vulnerable to how Uber 
handles finances.  
 The Florida Court mentions that “extent of control” is the most important factor in 
determining employment relationships, yet dismissed Uber’s control over contracts and payment 
as inconsequential.135 The Court emphasized the autonomy of the drivers, ignoring the fact that 
they only preside over trivial details.136 The drivers undeniably have some control, however the 
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ability to choose when and where to work is not as significant as that which Uber controls. By 
writing the contracts and sending drivers 1099 tax forms, Uber independently determines the 
drivers’ classification. By managing fares and payments, Uber also impacts the drivers’ income. 
The Florida Court seemed to look for the number of things controlled instead of their gravity, 
and thus failed to recognize Uber’s blatant abuse of power. 
 Uber exercises its control in a way that is exploitative because it profits from the drivers’ 
services while offering no benefits in return. Uber manipulates the legal and financial aspects of 
work to its advantage, putting the drivers in a position where they have little influence. Uber also 
makes decisions that greatly impact the drivers without consulting them. In contrast, the drivers’ 
autonomy has a comparatively insignificant effect on the company’s business. Even when a 
driver chooses to provide rides on competitors’ platforms, there are billions of others who work 
on Uber’s application. The drivers can occasionally make decisions that benefit them 
individually, such as when McGillis went out of his way to investigate the work opportunities 
that were most profitable.137 At the same time, this is also advantageous for Uber who collects a 
portion of his fares. Uber gains from drivers who provide outstanding services by working 
during crucial hours and in popular locations because they represent the company in a positive 
way. Of course, drivers with bad conduct reflect poorly on Uber, but Uber can punish them by 
deactivating their accounts. Still, Uber never rewards high-quality drivers with minimum wage 
or other benefits. 
 The New York and Florida cases dealt too much with the particularities of control even 
though the most telling element of the employment dynamic is power. No matter the control the 
drivers exercise, Uber ultimately exploits them. The ruling in the Florida case was based off a 
                                                
137 Ibid. 
   
 35 
misinterpretation of the most crucial aspects of the work arrangement. As a result, the already 
powerless drivers are now officially incapable of exercising their rights in the state. 
 
b. The Non-Traditional but Essential Work 
 
 Although the Florida Court disregarded the greater meaning of the extent of control, it 
did mention the contrast between Uber drivers and traditional employees.138 In the beginning of 
the Florida Court’s analysis, it is noted that modern technology is changing society.139 There is a 
description of how the Internet and smartphones allow people to connect in ways unlike ever 
before, including new business relationships through software like Uber.140 Due to these 
changes, the Court had to decide which of two existing legal categories this “multi-faceted 
product of new technology should be fixed into … when neither is a perfect fit.”141 It is clear that 
the Court recognizes the complexity of the issue, and even that Uber drivers are not exactly 
employees or independent contractors.  
 Uber drivers' work may not be traditional, but they are just as vital to the company as 
employees. This opinion is clear in the New York case after Judge Burrowes refuted Uber’s 
assertion that it is not a transportation company.142 Uber admits that it complies with Taxi and 
Limousine Commission’s rules and regulations, which govern the conduct of the for-hire driver 
industry.143 Uber has also described itself as a transportation company, such as in the 2014 
advertisement that called Uber “Everyone’s Private Driver,” and a 2016 internal memo that 
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stated “our goal at Uber is transportation as reliable as running water everywhere, and for 
everyone.”144 Judge Burrowes found that Uber is a transportation company and does not have its 
own staff that could provide the services the claimants did, so therefore “the claimants role as 
Drivers was a crucial aspect of Uber’s operation.”145 
 The Florida Court did not directly acknowledge that Uber drivers are essential for the 
business. In McGillis v. Uber, Uber is not described as a transportation company but “a 
technology platform that connects drivers with paying customers seeking transportation 
services.”146 The Florida Court stated that even though the “principal business is to provide 
transportation,” this fact alone does not mean the drivers are employees.147 Despite this claim, 
the Florida Court also found that “the central issue is the act of being available to accept 
requests, [and t]his control is entirely in the driver’s hands.”148 This can be interpreted as an 
admission that drivers control the “central issue” of Uber’s services, making them a key part of 
the company’s business.  
 This is also proven given the Uber platform's consistent operation. The Florida Court 
declared the drivers’ level of autonomy is unlike traditional employees, who would not be 
allowed this freedom if it meant customers go unserved.149 The New York case mentioned that 
drivers are actually expected to accept 90% of ride requests or they are relayed to the next closest 
driver within fifteen seconds.150 This would certainly leave few customers without service. 
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Furthermore, if the drivers exercise their ability to refuse rides so often that customers go 
unserved, Uber would not be able to operate. Even if Uber is only a “technology platform” that 
connects drivers to customers for transportation services, the platform needs drivers to provide 
these services. In short, Uber would not function without the drivers, so they are a fundamental 
part of the company.  
 It is evident that Uber is reliant on the drivers for the business to continue, which implies 
that Uber should have some responsibility over them. However, Uber treats them as independent 
contractors as if they have no meaningful tie to the company. Uber exploits them by creating a 
relation where they get nothing in return for their work, even though Uber could not exist 
without them. By ignoring the importance of the drivers, the Florida Court again overlooked a 
crucial element of the work relationship, reinforced the power imbalance, and encouraged a work 
situation where Uber drivers cannot exercise their rights. 
 
c. Greater Significance of the Rulings 
 
 Despite the omission of rights language, the Florida and New York cases have a 
substantial impact on Uber drivers’ human rights. Had the Florida Court applied the human 
rights framework to the case, it would have seen that Uber’s power abuse and exploitation of the 
workers proves that Uber is violating the drivers’ rights. States have the duty to protect their 
citizens, but Florida’s ruling for the independent contractor classification approved of Uber’s 
wrongful conduct. By failing to protect its citizens from violations by third parties, Florida itself 
is violating the drivers’ rights. 
 This problem is not specific to Uber drivers. In fact, the rights of all gig workers who are 
misclassified as independent contractors are violated by companies and governments who use the 
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classification. The Florida case is an excellent example of the problems of federalism in the 
United States legal system. The federal government has not resolved the issue, which leads to 
non-uniformity in state laws and decisions. This can lead to rights violations in certain states, 
such as Florida, because states focus on the identity of ‘employee’ and ‘independent contractor’ 
instead of power dynamics and rights.  
 Why is a simple word the determinant of rights under the United States legal system? The 
country has neglected new types of workers and relied on outdated and non-inclusive labor 
categories to determine what rights they are afforded. Employment classification, and labor 
identity in general, should be irrelevant because gig workers provide services for a company and 
deserve benefits because of that. Even more important is the fact that gig workers are human and 
therefore entitled to universal, inalienable human rights. 
V.  Employee or Not An Employee? That is the Question of 
Employment Tests 
 
 Courts determine whether workers are employees or independent contractors based on 
contracts and features of the work relationship. The most important tools for this are employment 
tests. Employment tests, also called worker classification tests, list criteria used to judge whether 
an employment relationship exists between two parties. Courts use these tests to identify which 
features of work should be analyzed and which employment classification the features indicate.  
 Employment tests may be crucial for gig workers. Federalism has led to conflicting 
positions on the classification of gig workers among states. The analysis in Section IV of this 
paper shows states courts have their own interpretation of what the most important factors of an 
employment relation are. However, employment tests are used in various states, so they could 
finally provide a conclusive determination on the classification of gig workers that transcends 
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state lines. By doing this, employment tests will also determine gig workers’ rights. This makes 
them extremely important, and they therefore deserve investigation. 
 There are numerous employment tests used in the United States. This section will assess 
the outcomes of the most popular employment tests when applied to Uber drivers, based on the 
information provided in the Florida and New York cases. 
 
The Restatement of the Law (Second) of Agency 
 
 The Restatement of the Law (Second) of Agency, applied in the Florida case, is used by 
the National Labor Relations Board and courts across the United States to determine whether 
workers are independent contractors or employees.151 The National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB)’s 2019 advice memorandum states Uber drivers are independent contractors based on 
the factors in the Restatement.152 Using the evidence from both the New York and Florida cases, 
however, the outcome of the test is not as straightforward as the NLRB and Florida opinions 
would suggest. 
Consider the factors addressed in McGillis v. Uber: extent of control, supervision, who 
supplies the tools and workplace, and method of payment.153 Among these, only the last two 
were uncontested in the New York case as well.154 The findings in regard to these two factors 
indicate an independent contractor relationship. Another element of the Restatement that 
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indicates likewise is “the length of time for which the person is employed.”155 Uber drivers have 
no specific duration of employment because they can start and stop using the application 
whenever they choose. This can be likened to the length of employment for independent 
contractors. 
There are other components of the Restatement that denote the drivers are employees, 
such as “the skill required in the particular occupation.”156 Working for Uber requires minimal 
skill and no specialization because driving is a common ability, whereas independent contractors 
may have received an education or training in their field. In addition, independent contractors 
might use business knowledge to maximize work opportunities, which is not required for Uber 
drivers to find work. The NLRB also pointed out that this factor supports the employee 
classification.157 
Another factor is “whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business.”158 Uber drivers do not have personal transportation businesses employed by Uber to 
provide a service for the company. Instead, the drivers are individuals who are hired to carry out 
Uber’s business. The NLRB admitted that Uber drivers are a part of Uber’s regular business of 
transporting passengers.159 The NLRB then stated that despite this, it is not a particularly strong 
or dispositive factor of the employment relation.160 The facts in the New York and Florida case 
suggest otherwise: Uber drivers are dedicated to Uber’s business, and Uber would not exist 
without the drivers to perform these services.  
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Similarly, another facet of an employment relation is if “the work is a part of the regular 
business of the employer.”161 Due to the work they perform, Uber drivers are engaged in the 
most fundamental part of Uber’s business. The Restatement also includes the factor, “whether 
the principal is or is not in business.”162 Uber is in the business of providing transportation 
services so the drivers are employees because, as found in the factor listed prior, their work is a 
part of the company’s business. 
 Other Restatement factors are more contentious. As the New York and Florida cases 
demonstrate, “extent of control” and “direct supervision” can be debated on both sides.163 The 
Restatement also includes the question “whether or not the parties believe they are creating the 
relation of master and servant.”164 This is challenging to analyze. Uber would surely assert it 
does not serve as a master, or employer, just as expressed in the contract. However, individual 
drivers may have their own perception of the relationship and whether they feel they are 
‘servants’ or independent. The assessment regards personal belief and would vary by the 
individual, so it is not the strongest piece of evidence to support either classification. 
 Using the evidence in the New York and Florida cases, this investigation of the 
employment status of Uber drivers found 3 factors that indicate Uber drivers are independent 
contractors, 4 factors that show they are employees, and 3 factors that are debatable. Overall, 
applying the Restatement test to Uber drivers yields an inconclusive finding. 
 
                                                
161 Darrin E. McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity and Uber Technologies, Inc. District 
Court of Florida, Third District (2017), No. 3D15-2758. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid.; Claimants v. Uber Technologies, Inc. New York Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 
(2017), No. 016-23858. 
164 Darrin E. McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity and Uber Technologies, Inc. District 
Court of Florida, Third District (2017), No. 3D15-2758. 
   
 42 
Internal Revenue Service Test 
 
 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is a United States agency that collects taxes for the 
federal government. The IRS has its own method of testing employment status, which is relevant 
because Uber drivers are provided 1099 tax forms that are used to report payments from 
independent contractors.165 The IRS assesses whether workers are independent contractors or 
employees based the parties’ degree of control and independence in three categories: behavioral 
control, financial control, and type of relationship.166  
Behavioral control refers to whether the employer controls what the worker does and how 
they do it.167 This includes instruction on when and where to work, the tools to use, and worker 
evaluation.168 Uber does not require drivers to work at specific times or locations and does not 
train them to drive. However, drivers must have cars and cell phones to work on the platform. In 
addition, although the two cases agreed Uber looks at drivers’ ratings for an overall assessment 
of their quality, they had opposite findings on whether Uber also monitors and manages the 
specifics of how they perform.169 Based on these disagreements, the category of behavioral 
control does not concretely suggest one employment category. 
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 Financial control is a consideration of whether “the business aspects of the worker’s job 
[are] controlled by the payer (these include things like how worker is paid, whether expenses are 
reimbursed, who provides tools/supplies, etc.)”170 The per-job method of payment and typically 
unreimbursed expenses indicate that the drivers are independent contractors.171 Drivers generally 
obtain cars and cell phones on their own, but according to the New York case Uber gave 
claimant AK a cell phone and assisted claimants JS and JH in leasing vehicles.172 Judge 
Burrowes also found that Uber controls and adjusts the amount of payment and does 
occasionally reimburse expenses, which adds further confusion to this category.173 
 Finally, the 'type of relationship’ concerns the contract, continued relationship, and 
whether the work performed is a key part of the business.174 The contract explicitly states Uber 
drivers are independent contractors, but the parties’ relationship can be debated as evidence for 
either the employee or independent contractor classification.175 The IRS includes benefits and the 
permanency in this category, both of which suggest Uber drivers are independent contractors.176 
Despite this, the fact that the drivers perform a crucial aspect of Uber’s business is undeniable.177 
If the employment relation is decided by weighing these factors against each other, Uber’s 
inability to operate without the drivers is objectively more important. 
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 Given that Uber drivers use independent contractor tax forms, it would be expected that 
the IRS test would indicate they are independent contractors. Despite this, each category contains 
individual elements that must be considered, and each other these elements contradict each other 
in regards to which classification they indicate. The ambiguity of these factors therefore makes 
the IRS test no more conclusive than the Restatement for officially determining the employment 
status of Uber drivers. 
 
Economic Realities Test 
 
 The Supreme Court uses the economic reality test to determine employment 
classification, applied in the case United States v. Silk, 331 US 704 (1947).178 This test involves 
six factors that determine whether the worker is reliant on the hiring entity, making them an 
employee. One factor is the control exercised by the employer, which, as stated throughout this 
paper, can be debated.179 Two other factors indicate Uber drivers are independent contractors: 
the extent of the relative investments of the worker and employer, and the permanency of the 
relationship.180  
 The remaining three factors support the classification of employee. One of these is 
whether the worker’s services are an “integral part of the employer’s business.”181 Uber’s 
business is to provide transportation service and Uber drivers carry out this service, so they are 
an integral part of the business. The second factor is the skill and initiative required for the 
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work.182 Driving does not require specialized skill, and the Uber application connects customers 
to the closest driver so drivers do not need to act independently to find work.183 Uber drivers may 
demonstrate initiative by going to locations where rides are in high demand, but this is not 
required for the job.184 The last factor that indicates Uber drivers are employees is the degree to 
which the worker’s “opportunity for profit and loss” is determined by the employer.”185 Drivers 
decide when to use the platform and can opt to accept promotions that would increase their 
profits. However, Uber connects drivers to customers, creates these promotions, and unilaterally 
adjusts payments, all of which impact the drivers’ earnings.186 Thus, a significant degree of 
opportunity for profit or loss is determined by Uber. 
 In this test, 3 factors suggest Uber drivers are employees, 2 factors indicate they are 
independent contractors, and only 1 factor could be debated. Compared with the other 
employment tests, the economic realities test is slightly more decisive. 
 
The ABC test and California: An Opportunity for Gig Workers 
 
A final employment assessment used in states across America is the ABC test. Under the 
ABC test, the burden is on the hiring entity to prove the workers are not employees based on 
three conditions.187 The first component of the ABC test is to prove: A) the worker is “free from 
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the control and direction of the hiring entity with the performance of the work, both under the 
contract and in fact.”188 Uber’s contract designates the drivers as independent contractors, but, as 
evidenced by the New York case, the actual practice may reveal Uber does control work 
performance.189 The second element is: B) the worker performs a service that is "outside the 
usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”190 Uber’s business is to provide transportation 
services, so Uber drivers’ work is part of the normal business.191 The final factor is: C) the 
worker must be “customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or 
business of the same nature as the work performed.”192 Uber drivers are hired as individual 
persons, not because they are have their own transportation service that Uber wants to utilize. 
Therefore, Uber drivers are not engaged in an independent business.  
 Under the ABC test, a worker is presumed to be an employee until the hiring entity 
proves otherwise for all of the three elements. Although there can be conflicting views on the 
matter of control, the fact that the drivers’ work is part of the usual course of Uber’s business 
simply cannot be disputed. The ABC test finally provides a conclusive determination that Uber 
drivers are employees. 
This test gained significance in the 2018 California case Dynamex Operations West, Inc. 
v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County.193 In the case, the Supreme Court of California 
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ruled that the ABC test is the appropriate test for determining employment classification.194 The 
Court made this decision based on the provisions of the California wage order governing the 
transportation industry, which define “employ” as “to suffer or permit to work.”195 As described 
in the case, this definition means “the work was performed with the knowledge of the 
employer… Defendant is only liable to those drivers with whom it entered into an agreement.”196 
By favoring this definition, the California Supreme Court rejected the previously used 
Borello test that determines the employment classification of workers, which lists 10 factors 
similar to those included in the Restatement test. The California Supreme Court also mentioned 
that the three common categories of employment tests are common-law tests that consider the 
workers’ control over the details of the work, including the IRS test, the economic realities test, 
and the ABC test. The Court concluded that the ABC test is simpler and clearer than the other 
tests because there are only three factors to consider. Furthermore, the ABC test minimizes the 
disadvantages workers face at work because they are presumed to be employees, and the 
California Court decided this is the most important purpose of employment tests.197 
The case Dynamex v. Superior Court concerned two delivery drivers who worked for the 
company Dynamex and claimed they were misclassified as independent contractors. In the past, 
Dynamex drivers were considered employees. This changed in 2004, when Dynamex introduced 
a new policy and contract that converted all drivers to independent contractors in order to create 
savings for the company. Dynamex has since contended that the contract makes the independent 
contractor classification correct. Certain features of the work are emblematic of independent 
contractors, and similar to the situation of Uber drivers: the company unilaterally controls prices 
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charged to the customers and payments made to the drivers; the company requires the drivers to 
pay all vehicle costs and maintenance; the drivers are required to obtain and pay for cell phones 
used to keep in contact with the company; the drivers are generally allowed to set their own work 
schedule; the drivers are allowed to reject assignments; and the drivers are allowed to make 
deliveries for competing companies when they are not doing so for Dynamex. One significant 
difference between Dynamex and Uber is that Dynamex drivers are not rated by customers, 
however Dynamex has the authority to terminate agreements with drivers without cause.198   
The plaintiffs in the case argued that even after 2004, Dynamex drivers performed the 
same tasks as those who were considered employees prior to the contract change. Their 
complaint alleged that as a result, Dynamex engaged in unfair and unlawful business practices in 
violation of California Business and Professions Code and violated California Labor Code by 
failing to pay overtime or reimburse expenses.199 This is comparable to how Uber’s manipulation 
of the work arrangement violates Uber drivers’ rights. 
Applying the ABC test to Dynamex drivers, the California Supreme first looked at factor 
B, whether the drivers’ work is outside the usual course of business. Dynamex’s business is to 
provide delivery services; therefore the California Court decided the drivers’ work is a normal 
part of the business.200 Second, the Court considered factor C, whether the drivers have an 
independently established trade or business.201 This case only involved the drivers who 
performed delivery services solely for Dynamex, so the drivers did not have their own 
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businesses.202 The Court did not consider factor A, most likely because Dynamex would not have 
been able to prove the other two factors indicate the drivers are independent contractors. 
Although the facts of the Dynamex case are not identical to the situation of Uber drivers, 
the California Supreme Court’s ruling led to a new California law that will impact Uber drivers 
as well. On September 11, 2019, the California Senate passed Assembly Bill 5, which will make 
the ABC test the official standard for determining employment classification in the state.203 Once 
California’s governor signs the bill, it will go into effect on January 1, 2020.204 This would be 
significant for gig workers in California because they would be presumed to be employees. 
Companies that would be affected by the law, including Uber, have already responded to 
the news. Uber’s chief legal officer, Tony West, commented that he believes Uber would pass 
the test, although he admits the most difficult factor to prove would be that the drivers’ work is 
not a part of the company’s usual business.205 He explained that Uber’s business is to serve as a 
technology platform, not to provide transportation services.206 He further stated that even if Uber 
did not pass the test, the company would still not reclassify the drivers as employees because it 
firmly believes the workers are independent contractors.207 The company is considering 
sponsoring a ballot in November 2020 that, if accepted by California voters, would make them 
exempt from the law.208 
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Uber has also tried to highlight the disadvantages of the bill. Primarily, Uber claims that 
the law would require companies to mandate schedules for Uber drivers if they are employees, 
taking away the flexibility they currently benefit from.209 Such restrictions on freedom are 
happening in New York City due to the new minimum wage law for ride-hailing platforms. Lyft 
now requires drivers to work in shifts so that drivers do not saturate the market and the company 
does not have to pay minimum wage for as many workers.210 Uber seems to be trying to frighten 
workers and convince them not to support the law. 
Adam Roston, chief executive officer of an on-demand staffing platform called 
Bluecrew, counter-argued that the new law does not require strict schedules, saying “it’s a false 
narrative that the flexibility of gig work and worker protections can’t coexist.”211 His point is 
true—nothing in the law says companies must impose restrictions on their workers. Instead, the 
law would rightfully force companies to recognize and reward workers whose services aid the 
company’s business, but have yet to receive benefits for this.  
Despite West’s assertions, Uber could fail the ABC test given the prior investigation of 
the ABC test applied to Uber drivers. Both the New York and Florida cases found that Uber’s 
business is to provide transportation services.212 Even if Uber references the National Labor 
Relations Board’s opinion that drivers are independent contractors to support of their argument, 
the NLRB also found that their work is a regular part of Uber’s business.213 Furthermore, Uber 
would still have to prove factor C, that the drivers have independent businesses. Uber would 
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have to prove this for each individual driver, and while this might result in some drivers being 
considered independent contractors, it might not result in that classification for the majority of 
Uber drivers. 
 The changes in California have positive implications for workers in the gig economy. In a 
BBC News article on the bill, it is mentioned that California is often the first state to introduce 
legislation that is soon adopted by other states as well.214 This could trigger other states to pass 
similar laws that presume gig workers to be employees, guaranteeing them rights and benefits 
under both state and federal law. Despite this possibility for monumental change for the gig 
economy, the California bill is still not a law as of yet. While waiting for this potential catalyst 
for uniformity, gig workers’ rights are still not protected universally in the United States. 
 
 The investigation of the Restatement, IRS, economic realities, and ABC employment 
tests is by no means exhaustive or official. Courts are certainly more qualified to use these tests 
and issue a decision, but this analysis serves to raise awareness of the inadequacies of labor 
legislation in the United States. Two of the most common avenues for determining employment 
status are failing: there is a variance between state court decisions, and many employment tests 
yield results that could be debated and do not clearly indicate one classification. There is an 
absence of a precise, universal method of determining employment classification even though 
the matter is of pressing importance. This has a profoundly negative effect on gig workers, 
whose rights are violated when they are classified as independent contractors. 
 
                                                
214 Lee, “California passes landmark gig economy rights bill.” 




 The disunity in the United States legal system is a barrier to human rights realization. 
This paper illustrates how the absence of federal legislation enables states to rule on the gig 
economy independently, leading to variation in labor standards across the United States. The 
difference in state rulings is due to an overriding focus on the technicalities of labor identity and 
classification, ignoring the broader power dynamics between workers and employers and the 
impact of this on human rights. Using Uber drivers as an example, this paper shows how this 
fractured system leads to rights violations. 
 The current labor legislation in the country is inadequate. Governments have the duty to 
protect their citizens and as society changes, laws need to adapt to address new forms of work 
and labor identities. The complexity of federalism is embodied in the conflict between 
constitutionalist and revisionist theories on the division of authority. This paper does not intend 
to suggest that a dominant federal government is the solution to the problems with labor identity 
and employment classification for workers in the gig economy. Instead, there must be uniformity 
across all bodies of the United States legal system in order to ensure that all workers are 
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